PrivEsc

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> Get-ADTrust -Filter *


Direction               : BiDirectional
DisallowTransivity      : False
DistinguishedName       : CN=zsm.local,CN=System,DC=painters,DC=htb
ForestTransitive        : True
IntraForest             : False
IsTreeParent            : False
IsTreeRoot              : False
Name                    : zsm.local
ObjectClass             : trustedDomain
ObjectGUID              : 7c5a3e64-19d9-45d1-b935-53c7ccf27c78
SelectiveAuthentication : False
SIDFilteringForestAware : False
SIDFilteringQuarantined : False
Source                  : DC=painters,DC=htb
Target                  : zsm.local
TGTDelegation           : False
TrustAttributes         : 8
TrustedPolicy           :
TrustingPolicy          :
TrustType               : Uplevel
UplevelOnly             : False
UsesAESKeys             : False
UsesRC4Encryption       : False

The IsTreeParent and IsTreeRoot shows that this is a forest -> forest relationship between painters.htb -> zsm.local. And the trust is bidirectional.

We can confirm that. And we are painters.htb

Who is zsm.local?

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FOREST_TRANSITIVE means, SID Filtering is NOT automatically enabled for forest trusts unless explicitly configured. If SID filtering is partially enabled (sometimes referred to as SID history enabledarrow-up-right), effectively only filtering out RID <1000, a ticket can be forged with an extra SID that contains the target domain and the RID of any group, with RID >= 1000). The ticket can then be used to conduct more attacks depending on the group's privileges.

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